



Principled System Architecture prerequisite for resilience

Robert Rasmussen

Copyright 2012 California Institute of Technology. Government sponsorship acknowledged.



“Resilience”

- ⊕ Literally, the ability to spring back
 - ✦ Resilient systems work, no matter what
- ⊕ Brittle systems are not resilient
 - ✦ Small problems easily break them



Engineered Resilience



⊕ Resilience in nature arises over many generations through trial and error

⊕ Engineered resilience must often be right the first time





Many Ways to Fail


- ⊕ Stakeholder concerns that aren't properly appreciated, reconciled, or accommodated
 - ⊕ Progress thwarted by intolerance to development uncertainties
 - ⊕ System interactions that come as a surprise
 - ⊕ Late discovery of design or implementation errors
 - ⊕ Unvalidated assumptions
 - ⊕ Poor risk assessments
 - ⊕ Inadequate or misapplied V&V
 - ⊕ Unethical conduct
 - ⊕ Flight manifestation of uncorrected design flaws
 - ⊕ Fatal defects in materials, implementation, workmanship, tools...
 - ⊕ Unusual or unanticipated environments
 - ✦ Stress damages the system
 - ✦ Control outside the validated regime
 - ⊕ Inability to degrade gracefully
 - ⊕ Changes in mission or usage that violate assumptions
 - ⊕ Operator error
 - ⊕ Malicious action
- et cetera!*

Often an unfortunate combination of things
Often resulting in convoluted behavior



We Know What Resilience Looks Like

Apollo 13*



Innovative repurposing

Galileo*



Computing margin and
flexible re-programmability

** So far, dependent on
many clever **people**
and considerable **luck***

Hubble Space Telescope*



On-orbit instrument
replaceability

T-800



Graceful degradation and
goal-oriented behavior

Titan Balloon




Self-direction and
tolerance for variety



Still Largely a Defensive Exercise

✦ Robust engineering tolerance is largely concerned with prescribed variation

- ✦ Depends on an assured perimeter
 - ✧ Qualification ranges, diligent oversight, “test as you fly...”, conservative analysis...
- ✦ And ample resources
 - ✧ Overdesign, operating margins, redundancy, schedule slack, opportunity to retry...



*Robustness is like siege defense:
Strong walls and plenty of supplies,
but not much freedom*

✦ Okay for lots of systems,
but always a limiting strategy


- ✦ Retry or retreat can't be the answer to every challenging situation



Do We Defend or Adapt?

⊕ Defense is increasingly an incomplete strategy

- ✦ Robustness is already a hard problem
- ✦ But problems are trending beyond robustness to matters of astuteness



⊕ Defense must be augmented with Adaptation

- ✦ Figure out what's happening and deal with it creatively
- ✦ Less canned responses; more cognitive, coherent deliberation
- ✦ Depends on acquiring knowledge, and an ability to solve problems and to improvise

⊕ This makes a hard problem *much* harder



Tough Architectural Questions

- ⊕ When is resilience the right answer?
- ⊕ Where does resilience fit among all other system concerns?
- ⊕ What are the technical and programmatic building blocks of resilience?
- ⊕ How does one provide a fundamental, reasoned basis for declaring that a system has resilience?



A Systems Engineering Challenge

- ⊕ No simple sum of technologies will do
 - ✦ Resilience of a system can't be derived from resilience of its parts
 - ✦ Resilience can't injected into a system or added onto it
- ⊕ Like all architectural considerations, resilience is a *system* characteristic
 - ✦ Simple problems can topple whole systems
 - ✦ All parts of system must participate in solutions
 - ✦ Adaptation requires reasoning about the system
 - ✦ Reasoning requires understandable systems
- ⊕ “The System” is not one thing, but many
 - ✦ Variation, surprise, and invention are to be expected, not avoided
 - ✦ Adaptation solutions are open ended
 - ✦ Engineering the design space is “architecture”



A Definition

- ⊕ A **System** is anything greater than the sum of its parts
 - ★ Every part affects others — the parts become one
- ⊕ *New* attributes, not intrinsic to the parts, arise *solely* from these **interactions**
 - ★ This phenomenon is commonly referred to as ***emergence***
- ⊕ Systems are intrinsically about ***what is added*** through interaction



Interaction, Not Interface

- ⊕ Interactions can be...
 - ✦ Exchanges of material, energy, or information
 - ✦ Coupled attributes or shared constraints
 - ✦ Planned or not planned
- ⊕ Interfaces *per se* are not paramount
- ⊕ What matters is how each part **affects** the others




Winslow Homer (1836 –1910)



Emergence, Not Integration

- ✦ Additions can be new capabilities, functions, or behaviors . . . **abstract entities, but...**
- ✦ **The resulting systems are new, *real things* in their own right**
 - ✦ *Not merely* an arrangement of parts and interfaces
 - ✦ Similar arrangements of different parts can yield essentially the same system
 - ✦ Different arrangements of similar parts can yield quite different systems






The Value in Thinking This Way

- ⊕ If you start to think about the features you want as ***things that must emerge*** through interaction...
- ⊕ Then you can't help *also* wondering about ***other things that might emerge***, besides the ones you intended
 - ★ Whatever produces one will inevitably produce the other as a side effect
 - ★ You must always worry about both
- ⊕ *How would you know?!*



The Complexity Crisis

- ✦ As complexity grows, the number of potential interactions grows disproportionately



- ✦ Each layer removes us further from core analytical capabilities
- ✦ Confidence diminishes in explaining how things work *a priori*
- ✦ Even “correct” designs surprise us routinely



Complexity \Rightarrow Misunderstanding

- ⊕ **Complexity** is basically a measure of how hard something is to **understand**
 - ✦ Variety, connectivity, depth, instability, opacity, intricacy, uncertainty, ambiguity...
 - ✦ Applies to **both analysis and communication**

- ⊕ Complexity occupies the space between understanding and reality
 - ✦ For a complex system to succeed, many things have to be done right
 - ✦ However, a complex system can fail, even when all its parts work as designed



The Central Problem...

⊕ In both science and engineering:


Find simple rules for complex behavior

- ✦ Rules are sought wherever there are **patterns**
 - ✦ Patterns are expressions of the underlying rules
 - ✧ **Recurring structure**
 - ✧ Invariants among items, which may appear on the surface to be different
 - ✧ **Layered descriptions**
 - ✧ Ideas explained in terms of what's already understood
 - ✧ **Separation of concerns**
 - ✧ Limits on what must be considered at one moment
- etc.



Good Patterns...

- ⊕ Not only describe — they explain!
 - ✦ As theories improve, they tend to become conceptually more abstract and layered
 - ✦ So the rules at each layer can become simpler





In Engineering The Same Principles Apply


- ⊕ Patterns impose order
 - ✦ Recurring Structure —
 - ✧ Mass production, standards for interface/form/process...
 - ✦ Layered Descriptions —
 - ✧ Hierarchical system design, protocol stacks...
 - ✦ Separation of Concerns —
 - ✧ Functional decomposition, weak coupling, modularity...
- ⊕ Order fosters understandability
- ⊕ These are the organizing **Concepts** of the architecture




Concepts Can Get Lost

- ⊕ Each part of a system participates in many concepts
- ⊕ This many-to-few mapping is responsible for troublesome entanglement of concepts in a complex system

Basic Concepts:



Complex Realization:



Example

An IMU is not merely a unit satisfying many disparate requirements flowed down “from above”

It is...

- a sensor in a control concept
- a region in a fault containment concept
- a load in a power concept
- a critical item in a safing concept
- a node in a networking concept
- a ward in a shielding concept
- a source in a telemetry concept, and so on

*Many more **conceptual** parts than **realizational** parts*



Nonetheless, Realization Seems To Rule!

- ⊕ We tend to describe concepts in terms of their concrete implementations, rather than basic ideas
 - ✦ Levels gets flattened
 - ✦ Disparate concerns are swept together
 - ✦ Attention shifts from similarities to differences
 - ✦ General rules are replaced by point design descriptions
- ⊕ **Complexity moves in to exploit inattention to pattern**



Concepts Need Space

- ✦ If concepts aren't clearly and separately delineated, patterns can't assert themselves in a systematic or reliable way
 - ✦ Even in realization, concepts must remain clearly articulated
- ✦ Handling each concept on its own terms permits each to take its preferred form
 - ✦ Many concepts can overlap in the same system, despite widely disparate structures
 - ✦ E.g., the physical and logical structure of the Internet are completely different (diverse inter-connected networks versus layered protocols)



Pattern versus Design

- ⊕ Conceptual patterns *must* retain prominence throughout the lifecycle
- ⊕ The **rules** that give rise to these patterns comprise a set of **constraints** on what we can design
 - ✦ They tell us both **what the design can and cannot be**
 - ✦ They allow as design only **what can be analyzed or validated**
- ⊕ They help us see **what is essential** to a design concept
- ⊕ It is from such **rules** and **exclusions** that **engineering elegance** is possible — without which...
 - ✦ Systems become increasingly muddled with incidental complexity
 - ✦ Piecemeal, ad hoc accommodations gradually ossify designs
 - ✦ Understanding becomes increasingly difficult
 - ✦ Shortfalls in functionality and efficiency are inevitable



However, Not All Patterns are Created Equal

- ⊕ We are awash in engineering “patterns”
 - ✦ Projects generate thousands of pages of design description in many forms
 - ✦ They describe modules, hierarchies, protocols, design requirements, processes, and so on — eventually in great detail
 - ✦ There are schemes for bus communications, power & grounding, fault containment, sequence coordination, time synchronization, and on and on
- ⊕ It's a mixed story
 - ✦ Some work a lot better than others
 - ✦ Some are arbitrary
 - ✦ And some old standbys are notoriously poor
- ⊕ Many, however, have no clear conceptual delineation
 - ✦ We know something important is happening, but...
 - ✦ Like undiscovered Laws of Nature, they have no explanatory power



Lessons from Nature

- ⊕ Complex, engineered systems are understandable only if well-chosen patterns are imposed to make understanding possible
- ⊕ We seek patterns that are...
 - ✦ **Stable** — won't need frequent revision
 - ✦ **Fundamental** — broadly address important issues
- ⊕ As in nature these tend to be **simple**
- ⊕ But being **complete** and **consistent** are also essential



Also Important...

- ⊕ Good patterns adhere strongly to aesthetics, experience, and fundamental **principles**
- ⊕ Their rules enable **modeling** of adequate form & fidelity to address all attributes of concern
- ⊕ They are easily explained, so that **compliance** can be required and verified
- ⊕ In other words, we choose the patterns that permit us to demonstrate with confidence the correctness and suitability of our concepts

**Good patterns
make such understanding practical**



A Fault Management Example



Typical Fault Management Notions

“Concepts”

- ⊕ Fault Tree, Failure Modes & Effects Analysis
- ⊕ Error, Fault, Failure
- ⊕ Threshold, Event, Persistence
- ⊕ Detection, Monitor, Isolation, Response
- ⊕ Priority, Level
- ⊕ Critical Period, Mark & Rollback
- ⊕ Safing

etc.

“Patterns”

- ⊕ Monitors trigger responses
- ⊕ Every monitor and response can be disabled
- ⊕ Responses terminate command sequences

etc.

“Principles”

- ⊕ Respond only to unacceptable conditions
- ⊕ Avoid hair triggers and retriggering
- ⊕ Tolerate false alarms
- ⊕ Make parameters commandable
- ⊕ Corroborate before severe responses
- ⊕ Ensure commandability and long term safety
- ⊕ Preserve consumables and critical data
- ⊕ Log events and actions

etc.



Fundamental?

⊕ Not Really

- ✦ Imprecise and fragmented concepts
 - ✦ Weak patterns and principles
 - ✦ Exceptions and omissions
 - ✦ Cluttered with incidentals
-
- ✦ Part of an even larger collection of interrelated notions in system management
 - ✦ Yet generally implemented separate from them

⊕ No concise “Theory of Fault Protection”



A Sample Conceptual Mapping Issue

⊕ Persistence threshold value:

- ✦ Appears in monitoring functions, but is it...
- ✦ Likelihood, transient duration, system error tolerance, response delay, false alarm avoidance, or what?

⊕ Role depends on assumed meaning

- ✦ Detection in state estimation
- ✦ Branching in control decisions
- ✦ Precedence among objectives
- ✦ etc.



Back to Basics

What Does Fault Management Do?

- ⊕ **Observes the system** *(measurements...)*
- ⊕ **Uses models** *(failure modes...)*
- ⊕ **Estimates system state** *(health, hazards...)*
- ⊕ **Choses and coordinates actions** *(conflicts, resource use...)*
- ⊕ **Directs the system** *(commands...)*
- ⊕ **Meets system objectives** *(safety, viability, critical events...)*

**Fault Management is *part of*
an *integrated* Control System**



Cognitive Control Fundamentals

Concepts

- ⊕ Objectives on state
- ⊕ Models of state behavior
- ⊕ Knowledge of state
- ⊕ Closed control loops on state

Patterns

- ⊕ Each system state is assigned a cognizant control system
- ⊕ Control systems interact via explicit state knowledge and coordinated objectives
- ⊕ Knowledge and control designs exploit models

Principles

- ⊕ Make objectives explicit, complete and clear
- ⊕ Uniquely assign responsibility for all objectives on a state
- ⊕ Make model usage apparent and consistent
- ⊕ Explicitly coordinate concurrent objectives
- ⊕ Keep state estimation independent of state control
- ⊕ Represent state knowledge uncertainty openly and objectively
- ⊕ Strive for a single source of truth for state knowledge
- ⊕ Make control decisions based only on state knowledge and objectives



Differences in Perspective When Concepts Retain Prominence

- ⊕ “Fault management” detects and responds to faults
 - ⊕ **Fault tolerant control systems** achieve important system objectives, even when faults happen
 - ⊕ “Fault management” is verified by testing all monitors and responses
 - ⊕ **Fault tolerant control systems** are verified by showing how well they guard expectations of system performance
- and so on



Resilience Architecture

- ✦ What are the patterns and principles of resilience?
 - ✦ If there is not theory for fault tolerance (or other matters), how could there be one for resilience?
- ✦ Is overall architectural integrity a prerequisite for resilience?
 - ✦ If an architecture can't easily be understood, how could one claim it is resilient?
- ✦ How can architectural concepts for resilience be integrated without losing their integrity?
 - ✦ If the patterns and principles of resilience aren't apparent in the system, how would one know they are still there?



Conclusion

**Resilience starts
with strong concepts**

**Resilience ends
when conceptual integrity is lost**

Practice principled architecture!