



# Principled System Architecture prerequisite for resilience

Robert Rasmussen

Copyright 2012 California Institute of Technology. Government sponsorship acknowledged.



# “Resilience”

- ⊕ Literally, the ability to spring back
  - ✦ Resilient systems work, no matter what
  
- ⊕ Brittle systems are not resilient
  - ✦ Small problems easily break them



# Engineered Resilience



⊕ Resilience in nature arises over many generations through trial and error

⊕ Engineered resilience must often be right the first time





# Many Ways to Fail


- ⊕ Stakeholder concerns that aren't properly appreciated, reconciled, or accommodated
  - ⊕ Progress thwarted by intolerance to development uncertainties
  - ⊕ System interactions that come as a surprise
  - ⊕ Late discovery of design or implementation errors
  - ⊕ Unvalidated assumptions
  - ⊕ Poor risk assessments
  - ⊕ Inadequate or misapplied V&V
  - ⊕ Unethical conduct
  - ⊕ Flight manifestation of uncorrected design flaws
  - ⊕ Fatal defects in materials, implementation, workmanship, tools...
  - ⊕ Unusual or unanticipated environments
    - ✦ Stress damages the system
    - ✦ Control outside the validated regime
  - ⊕ Inability to degrade gracefully
  - ⊕ Changes in mission or usage that violate assumptions
  - ⊕ Operator error
  - ⊕ Malicious action
- et cetera!*

**Often an unfortunate combination of things**  
**Often resulting in convoluted behavior**



# We Know What Resilience Looks Like

## Apollo 13\*



Innovative repurposing



## Galileo\*



Computing margin and  
flexible re-programmability

*\* So far, dependent on  
many clever **people**  
and considerable **luck***

## Hubble Space Telescope\*



On-orbit instrument  
replaceability

## T-800



Graceful degradation and  
goal-oriented behavior

## Titan Balloon




Self-direction and  
tolerance for variety



# Still Largely a Defensive Exercise

⊕ Robust engineering tolerance is largely concerned with prescribed variation


- ✦ Depends on an assured perimeter
  - ◇ Qualification ranges, diligent oversight, “test as you fly...”, conservative analysis...
- ✦ And ample resources
  - ◇ Overdesign, operating margins, redundancy, schedule slack, opportunity to retry...



*Robustness is like siege defense:  
Strong walls and plenty of supplies,  
but not much freedom*


⊕ Okay for lots of systems,  
but always a limiting strategy

- ✦ Retry or retreat can't be the answer to every challenging situation



# Do We Defend or Adapt?

- ⊕ Defense is increasingly an incomplete strategy
  - ✦ Robustness is already a hard problem
  - ✦ But problems are trending beyond robustness to matters of astuteness



- ⊕ Defense must be augmented with Adaptation
  - ✦ Figure out what's happening and deal with it creatively
  - ✦ Less canned responses; more cognitive, coherent deliberation
  - ✦ Depends on acquiring knowledge, and an ability to solve problems and to improvise
- ⊕ This makes a hard problem *much* harder



# Tough Architectural Questions

- ⊕ When is resilience the right answer?
- ⊕ Where does resilience fit among all other system concerns?
- ⊕ What are the technical and programmatic building blocks of resilience?
- ⊕ How does one provide a fundamental, reasoned basis for declaring that a system has resilience?




# A Systems Engineering Challenge

- ⊕ No simple sum of technologies will do
  - ✦ Resilience of a system can't be derived from resilience of its parts
  - ✦ Resilience can't injected into a system or added onto it
  
- ⊕ Like all architectural considerations, resilience is a *system* characteristic
  - ✦ Simple problems can topple whole systems
  - ✦ All parts of system must participate in solutions
  - ✦ Adaptation requires reasoning about the system
  - ✦ Reasoning requires understandable systems
  
- ⊕ “The System” is not one thing, but many
  - ✦ Variation, surprise, and invention are to be expected, not avoided
  - ✦ Adaptation solutions are open ended
  - ✦ Engineering the design space is “architecture”



# A Definition

- ⊕ A **System** is anything greater than the sum of its parts
  - ✦ Every part affects others — the parts become one
- ⊕ *New* attributes, not intrinsic to the parts, arise *solely* from these **interactions**
  - ✦ This phenomenon is commonly referred to as ***emergence***
- ⊕ Systems are intrinsically about ***what is added*** through interaction



# Interaction, Not Interface

- ⊕ Interactions can be...
  - ✦ Exchanges of material, energy, or information
  - ✦ Coupled attributes or shared constraints
  - ✦ Planned or not planned
- ⊕ Interfaces *per se* are not paramount
- ⊕ What matters is how each part **affects** the others




Winslow Homer (1836 –1910)



# Emergence, Not Integration

- ⊕ Additions can be new capabilities, functions, or behaviors . . . **abstract entities, but...**
- ⊕ **The resulting systems are new, *real things* in their own right**
  - ★ *Not merely* an arrangement of parts and interfaces
  - ★ Similar arrangements of different parts can yield essentially the same system
  - ★ Different arrangements of similar parts can yield quite different systems






# The Value in Thinking This Way

- ⊕ If you start to think about the features you want as ***things that must emerge*** through interaction...
  
- ⊕ Then you can't help *also* wondering about ***other things that might emerge***, besides the ones you intended
  - ★ Whatever produces one will inevitably produce the other as a side effect
  - ★ You must always worry about both
  
- ⊕ *How would you know?!*




# The Complexity Crisis

- ✦ As complexity grows, the number of potential interactions grows disproportionately



- ✦ Each layer removes us further from core analytical capabilities
- ✦ Confidence diminishes in explaining how things work *a priori*
- ✦ Even “correct” designs surprise us routinely



# Complexity $\Rightarrow$ Misunderstanding

- ⊕ **Complexity** is basically a measure of how hard something is to **understand**
  - ✦ Variety, connectivity, depth, instability, opacity, intricacy, uncertainty, ambiguity...
  - ✦ Applies to **both analysis and communication**
  
- ⊕ Complexity occupies the space between understanding and reality
  - ✦ For a complex system to succeed, many things have to be done right
  - ✦ However, a complex system can fail, even when all its parts work as designed



# The Central Problem...

⊕ In both science and engineering:


*Find simple rules for complex behavior*

- ✦ Rules are sought wherever there are **patterns**
  - ✦ Patterns are expressions of the underlying rules
    - ◇ **Recurring structure**
      - ◇ Invariants among items, which may appear on the surface to be different
    - ◇ **Layered descriptions**
      - ◇ Ideas explained in terms of what's already understood
    - ◇ **Separation of concerns**
      - ◇ Limits on what must be considered at one moment
- etc.



# Good Patterns...


- ⊕ Not only describe — they explain!
  - ✦ As theories improve, they tend to become conceptually more abstract and layered
  - ✦ So the rules at each layer can become simpler




$$R_{ab} \quad \frac{1}{2} R g_{ab} = \frac{8\pi G}{c^4} T_{ab}$$

NGC 4696



DNA

$$F(n) = F(n-1) + F(n-2)$$


Fibonacci spirals

0
1
1
2
3
5
8
13
21
34
55
89
144



fractal fern


Rule 30





Conus textile



$$H(t) |\psi(t)\rangle = i\hbar \frac{\partial}{\partial t} |\psi(t)\rangle$$




# In Engineering The Same Principles Apply


- ⊕ Patterns impose order
  - ✦ Recurring Structure —
    - ◇ Mass production, standards for interface/form/process...
  - ✦ Layered Descriptions —
    - ◇ Hierarchical system design, protocol stacks...
  - ✦ Separation of Concerns —
    - ◇ Functional decomposition, weak coupling, modularity...
- ⊕ Order fosters understandability
- ⊕ These are the organizing **Concepts** of the architecture




# Concepts Can Get Lost

- ⊕ Each part of a system participates in many concepts
- ⊕ This many-to-few mapping is responsible for troublesome entanglement of concepts in a complex system

**Basic Concepts:**



**Complex Realization:**



## Example

An IMU is not merely a unit satisfying many disparate requirements flowed down “from above”

It is...

- a sensor in a control concept
- a region in a fault containment concept
- a load in a power concept
- a critical item in a safing concept
- a node in a networking concept
- a ward in a shielding concept
- a source in a telemetry concept, and so on

*Many more conceptual parts than realizational parts*




# Nonetheless, Realization Seems To Rule!

- ⊕ We tend to describe concepts in terms of their concrete implementations, rather than basic ideas
  - ✦ Levels gets flattened
  - ✦ Disparate concerns are swept together
  - ✦ Attention shifts from similarities to differences
  - ✦ General rules are replaced by point design descriptions
  
- ⊕ **Complexity moves in to exploit inattention to pattern**



# Concepts Need Space


- ✦ If concepts aren't clearly and separately delineated, patterns can't assert themselves in a systematic or reliable way
  - ✦ Even in realization, concepts must remain clearly articulated
- ✦ Handling each concept on its own terms permits each to take its preferred form
  - ✦ Many concepts can overlap in the same system, despite widely disparate structures
    - ✦ E.g., the physical and logical structure of the Internet are completely different (diverse inter-connected networks versus layered protocols)





# Pattern versus Design

- ⊕ Conceptual patterns *must* retain prominence throughout the lifecycle
- ⊕ The **rules** that give rise to these patterns comprise a set of **constraints** on what we can design
  - ✦ They tell us both **what the design can and cannot be**
  - ✦ They allow as design only **what can be analyzed or validated**
- ⊕ They help us see **what is essential** to a design concept
- ⊕ It is from such **rules** and **exclusions** that **engineering elegance** is possible — without which...
  - ✦ Systems become increasingly muddled with incidental complexity
  - ✦ Piecemeal, ad hoc accommodations gradually ossify designs
  - ✦ Understanding becomes increasingly difficult
  - ✦ Shortfalls in functionality and efficiency are inevitable



# However, Not All Patterns are Created Equal

- ⊕ We are awash in engineering “patterns”
  - ✦ Projects generate thousands of pages of design description in many forms
  - ✦ They describe modules, hierarchies, protocols, design requirements, processes, and so on — eventually in great detail
  - ✦ There are schemes for bus communications, power & grounding, fault containment, sequence coordination, time synchronization, and on and on
  
- ⊕ It’s a mixed story
  - ✦ Some work a lot better than others
  - ✦ Some are arbitrary
  - ✦ And some old standbys are notoriously poor
  
- ⊕ Many, however, have no clear conceptual delineation
  - ✦ We know something important is happening, but...
  - ✦ Like undiscovered Laws of Nature, they have no explanatory power



# Lessons from Nature

- ⊕ Complex, engineered systems are understandable only if well-chosen patterns are imposed to make understanding possible
  
- ⊕ We seek patterns that are...
  - ✦ **Stable** — won't need frequent revision
  - ✦ **Fundamental** — broadly address important issues
  
- ⊕ As in nature these tend to be **simple**
  
- ⊕ But being **complete** and **consistent** are also essential



## Also Important...

- ⊕ Good patterns adhere strongly to aesthetics, experience, and fundamental **principles**
- ⊕ Their rules enable **modeling** of adequate form & fidelity to address all attributes of concern
- ⊕ They are easily explained, so that **compliance** can be required and verified
- ⊕ In other words, we choose the patterns that permit us to demonstrate with confidence the correctness and suitability of our concepts

**Good patterns  
make such understanding practical**



# A Fault Management Example



# Typical Fault Management Notions

## “Concepts”

- ⊕ Fault Tree, Failure Modes & Effects Analysis
- ⊕ Error, Fault, Failure
- ⊕ Threshold, Event, Persistence
- ⊕ Detection, Monitor, Isolation, Response
- ⊕ Priority, Level
- ⊕ Critical Period, Mark & Rollback
- ⊕ Safing

*etc.*

## “Patterns”

- ⊕ Monitors trigger responses
- ⊕ Every monitor and response can be disabled
- ⊕ Responses terminate command sequences

*etc.*

## “Principles”

- ⊕ Respond only to unacceptable conditions
- ⊕ Avoid hair triggers and retriggering
- ⊕ Tolerate false alarms
- ⊕ Make parameters commandable
- ⊕ Corroborate before severe responses
- ⊕ Ensure commandability and long term safety
- ⊕ Preserve consumables and critical data
- ⊕ Log events and actions

*etc.*



# Fundamental?

## ⊕ Not Really

- ✦ Imprecise and fragmented concepts
  - ✦ Weak patterns and principles
  - ✦ Exceptions and omissions
  - ✦ Cluttered with incidentals
- 
- ✦ Part of an even larger collection of interrelated notions in system management
  - ✦ Yet generally implemented separate from them

## ⊕ No concise “Theory of Fault Protection”



# A Sample Conceptual Mapping Issue

- ⊕ Persistence threshold value:
  - ✦ Appears in monitoring functions, but is it...
  - ✦ Likelihood, transient duration, system error tolerance, response delay, false alarm avoidance, or what?
  
- ⊕ Role depends on assumed meaning
  - ✦ Detection in state estimation
  - ✦ Branching in control decisions
  - ✦ Precedence among objectives
  - ✦ etc.



## Back to Basics

# What Does Fault Management Do?

- ⊕ **Observes the system** *(measurements...)*
- ⊕ **Uses models** *(failure modes...)*
- ⊕ **Estimates system state** *(health, hazards...)*
- ⊕ **Chooses and coordinates actions** *(conflicts, resource use...)*
- ⊕ **Directs the system** *(commands...)*
- ⊕ **Meets system objectives** *(safety, viability, critical events...)*

**Fault Management is *part of*  
an *integrated* Control System**



# Cognitive Control Fundamentals

## Concepts

- ⊕ Objectives on state
- ⊕ Models of state behavior
- ⊕ Knowledge of state
- ⊕ Closed control loops on state

## Patterns

- ⊕ Each system state is assigned a cognizant control system
- ⊕ Control systems interact via explicit state knowledge and coordinated objectives
- ⊕ Knowledge and control designs exploit models

## Principles

- ⊕ Make objectives explicit, complete and clear
- ⊕ Uniquely assign responsibility for all objectives on a state
- ⊕ Make model usage apparent and consistent
- ⊕ Explicitly coordinate concurrent objectives
- ⊕ Keep state estimation independent of state control
- ⊕ Represent state knowledge uncertainty openly and objectively
- ⊕ Strive for a single source of truth for state knowledge
- ⊕ Make control decisions based only on state knowledge and objectives



## Differences in Perspective When Concepts Retain Prominence

- ⊕ “Fault management” detects and responds to faults
  - ⊕ **Fault tolerant control systems** achieve important system objectives, even when faults happen
  - ⊕ “Fault management” is verified by testing all monitors and responses
  - ⊕ **Fault tolerant control systems** are verified by showing how well they guard expectations of system performance
- and so on



# Resilience Architecture

- ⊕ What are the patterns and principles of resilience?
  - ✦ If there is not theory for fault tolerance (or other matters), how could there be one for resilience?
- ⊕ Is overall architectural integrity a prerequisite for resilience?
  - ✦ If an architecture can't easily be understood, how could one claim it is resilient?
- ⊕ How can architectural concepts for resilience be integrated without losing their integrity?
  - ✦ If the patterns and principles of resilience aren't apparent in the system, how would one know they are still there?



# Conclusion

**Resilience starts  
with strong concepts**

**Resilience ends  
when conceptual integrity is lost**

**Practice principled architecture!**